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Abstract  
The increased digitalisation of society and recent developments in AI is laying the 
ground for surveillance capabilities of a magnitude we have not seen before. 
Surveillance can be conducted by several different actors in society, this project 
focuses on the Swedish police currently using a large ensemble of surveillance 
technologies. Earlier this year, significant legislative changes governing the police 
authorities use of digital surveillance were enacted. These changes mean that the 
police now have been given an extended mandate to use digital surveillance as part of 
their professional practice, which places demands on balanced decisions and 
informed responsibility. On the one hand, the police have an interest to use digital 
surveillance to increase efficiency and security in society; on the other hand, the 
police must balance their interests with citizen’s so-called integrity-interests and right 
to privacy. This study will therefore examine to what extent the Swedish Police 
Authority pay attention to questions such as integrity and privacy when introducing 
digital surveillance. The study is guided by the following questions: (i) What 
opportunities can be related to the implementation and use of digital surveillance in 
police work? (ii) What kind of challenges do the increasing use of digital surveillance 
create between organisational governance, police officers’ work practice, and the 
integrity of citizens - and how do the police tackle these challenges? Theoretically, we 
draw on the established research fields on surveillance and privacy and empirically 
this study is designed as a qualitative study of the Swedish Police as our main case.  
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1. Introduction 
Surveillance is not a new phenomenon in society, but the increased digitalisation of 
society and recent developments in Artificial Intelligence (AI) and machine learning 
is laying the ground for powerful surveillance capabilities of a magnitude we have not 
seen before (European Commission, 2020). One of the most significant changes, due 
to the continued digital development, is that today’s surveillance systems become 
more powerful, subtler, further automated and large-scale in their collection of sharing 
and storage of data, often also ubiquitous and difficult to detect (Matzner, 2016). It 
has been argued that today’s digital technologies enable much more efficient control 
of the citizens than what Georg Orwell predicted in his dystopian classic ‘1984’ 
(Murray, 2016). Literature has acknowledged the tension between, on the one hand, 
society’s desire and need for security and, on the other hand, the individual’s right to 
integrity and privacy (Helm and Seubert, 2020; Solove, 2011). The growing public 
fear of acts of terrorism following the 9/11 paired with the continuous technological 
development, threatens to tilt this balance further over towards security. Law 
proposals never passed due to their controversial nature were implemented overnight 
in the wake of the terrorist attacks during the early years of the new millennium 
(Lyon, 2015). A more recent illustration can be found in relation to the spread of the 
Covid-19 pandemic, where public authorities in various European countries quickly 
extended their mandate to use digital technologies to monitor citizens. 
 
Surveillance can be conducted by a number of different actors and also on different 
levels in society. This study focuses upon digital surveillance conducted by public 
authorities and a central actor in this context is police authorities currently using a 
large number of surveillance technologies. Technology plays a key role in police work 
with expectations of improved effectiveness and legitimacy (Manning, 2016). 
Emerging technologies can be described as extending police officers’ capacity to see, 
hear, communicate, record, recognize, and analyse (Haggerty and Ericson, 1999, 
Eneman et al, 2018). Information gathering about human behavior and environment is 
a fundamental component in police work and digital technologies can, from a police 
perspective, be seen as ideal for collecting, process and store large volumes of 
information. In this study, we are focusing upon police authorities use of digital 
surveillance technologies, since many police authorities world-wide currently are 
using, and increasingly so, a large ensemble of surveillance technologies. This 
includes stationary surveillance systems (e.g., CCTV), body-worn cameras, cameras 
in cars, drones and a variety of sensors and more. In addition, the most recent 
developments in algorithms and artificial intelligence advances the analytical 
capabilities in surveillance further, for example by enabling large-scale face and 
motion recognition, with major expectations on improved effectiveness, security, 
transparency and legitimacy. On the one hand, these surveillance technologies are 
described as tools with expectations of improving effectiveness and security in 
society, on the other hand the technologies are associated with concern of threats to 
individuals’ integrity and privacy since large volumes of personal and sensitive data 
easily can be collected and processed both within and between systems. To what 
extent public authorities acknowledge this duality remains largely unknown. 
 
This study is empirically based on concrete initiatives taken by the Swedish Police 
Authority introduction of digital surveillance. Swedish public authorities, and 
especially the police, are surrounded and regulated by legislations, statutes and 
policies. To ensure and improve the protection of individuals’ personal data in todays’ 
digital society, a number of legislations and statutes have been created and 
implemented, both on national (e.g. The Swedish Camera Surveillance Act 
(2018:1200)) level and on EU-level (e.g. The General Data Protection Regulation 
GDPR). The Swedish legislation - The Camera Surveillance Act (2018:1200) has 
recently been subject to some significant changes. According to the initial legislation 
enacted 2018, the Swedish police had to apply for permission at the Swedish Data 
Protection Authority before they were allowed to implement surveillance technologies 
as part of police work (body-worn cameras are an exception due to the mobility 
aspect). The new legislative change, enacted January 1, 2020, have however removed 
the old requirement of applying for permission at the Swedish Data Protection 
Authority. This means that the Swedish police now has been given an extended 
mandate (and power) to make the decisions regarding the implementation and use of 
digital surveillance. Thus, this means that they now are responsible for the process of 
assessing the different interests involved. They have to consider the police authorities’ 
interest in and need to implement digital surveillance in parallel with considering 
citizen’s so-called integrity-interest. This recent development is highly relevant for 
this study due to the risk of setbacks regarding privacy protection at a societal level.  
 
Purpose and research questions  
As described, the Swedish police is currently using an assemblage of digital 
surveillance technologies with high expectations on improved effectiveness and 
security. The increased use of surveillance technologies will doubtlessly affect society 
in multiple ways, with opportunities as well as challenges and foreseen as well as 
unforeseen consequences. Digital surveillance is already used in a variety of contexts 
and is expected to be further extended. Nevertheless, a range of highly important 
questions concerning implementation, organisation, use, governance/regulation, 
management and storage of collected data and aspects related to privacy remain to be 
investigated (Mateescu et al., 2016; The Swedish Data Protection Authority, 2020). 
The empirical starting point and the main case for this study is (as mentioned above) 
the Swedish police, but other related public authorities, such as The Swedish Data 
Protection Authority, The Ministry of Justice, The Swedish Prosecution Authority, 
The Crime Prevention Council and The Swedish Civil Contingencies, will also be 
included.  
 
With this as a background, this study will explore the following two research 
questions: (i) What opportunities can be related to the implementation and use of 
digital surveillance in police work? (ii) What kind of challenges do the increasing use 
of digital surveillance create between organisational governance, police officers’ work 
practice, and the integrity of citizens - and how do the police tackle these challenges? 
Theoretically, we draw on the established research fields on surveillance and privacy 
and empirically this study is designed as a qualitative study of the Swedish Police as 
our main case.  
2. Theoretical foundations 
 
Surveillance 
The term surveillance (from the French verb meaning to watch over) refers to 
processes with a particular interest in watching human behavior that go far beyond 
common curiosity (Lyon, 2015). Surveillance is the focused, systematic and routine 
attention to personal details for certain purposes, its attention is mainly directed to 
individuals (Matzner, 2016). The focus on individuals, human behavior and personal 
details should not be understood as something random or spontaneous, it is deliberate 
(Lyon, 2018; Matzner, 2016). Surveillance has been recognised as a difficult concept 
to theorise because of its broad and slippery nature, and the fact that it refers to 
everything from practices, processes, uses, and contexts, to technology, renders it not 
easily amenable to generalizing statements (Haggerty and Ericson, 2006). 
Nonetheless, as Haggerty et al. (2011) explain, “it is undeniable that we are in the 
midst of a fundamental transformation in the scope, intensity and functioning of 
surveillance, something that makes the task of theorizing surveillance in all domains 
all the more pressing” (p. 233-234).  
  
One of the most unparalleled metaphors of the power of surveillance in our 
contemporary society is panopticon - originally an architecture design developed by 
Bentham as a special surveillance tower for a prison (Foucault, 1979). This 
architecture consists of a central visible surveillance tower and a courtyard surrounded 
by an outer ring of cells (Willcocks, 2004). The visibility aspect is of vital importance 
in the panopticon design, since it constantly reminds the prisoners of the possibility of 
being observed (Foucault, 1979). The design is based upon the principle that the few 
guards in the tower could watch the many prisoners in the cells, while the observed 
could not communicate with each other, nor see the observers, but are constantly 
aware of the risk of being monitored by the guards. With this design, surveillance 
became automated and depersonalized as the identity of the observer remains hidden 
(Lyon, 2015). Foucault (1979) reinvented the concept of panopticon as a metaphor for 
modern disciplinary societies. Panopticon can be seen as the illusion of constant 
surveillance, since the prisoners are constantly aware of the risk of being monitored 
regardless if they are monitored or not (Foucault, 1979; Willcocks, 2004). The feeling 
of constant surveillance creates a permanent panopticon, where the prisoners act as if 
they are constantly monitored. The panopticon design constitutes a power mechanism 
that aims to control and discipline the prisoners’ behaviours (Willcocks, 2004). As the 
individual prisoners fear that they might be watched, and fear punishment for 
transgressions, they internalise rules (Foucault 1979). Through the use of digital 
technologies, the surveillance capabilities have been expanded and further automated, 
not least since the technologies enable many processes and tasks to be performed at 
the same tie, can be used to large-scale collection and storage of data  also allows for 
data to rapidly flow within and between different systems (Bauman & Lyon, 2013). 
The issue of visibility is a significant difference between the original panopticon and 
digital surveillance technologies since todays surveillance systems often are concealed 
in the environment and thus invisible for individuals in society (Lyon, 2018). Even 
that panopticon is a strong metaphor to conceptualize and understand surveillance 
practices it has been subject for certain critique for its potential limitations to 
adequately understand contemporary technological societies (Zuboff, 2019). The 
critique has mainly questioned whether researchers should move beyond panopticon 
when studying surveillance in modern society based upon the argument that the 
concept may not cover and reflect all aspects of new technologies (Haggerty, 2006). 
However, despite the critique, the concept of panopticon is still central and widely 
used in surveillance studies in contemporary societies (Lyon, 2018; Eneman 2009).  
 
As described above in the introduction, surveillance is not a new phenomenon, the 
increased digitalization of society has however profoundly altered the surveillance 
capabilities. One of the most significant changes is that digital technology enables 
surveillance system to become more powerful, further automated, subtle and can be 
used for large-scale collection and storage of data (Matzner, 2016). A consequence of 
this is that individuals are not always aware of when being exposed to surveillance, 
which could be seen as a serious threat to individuals’ privacy (Whitaker, 1999). 
Another effect is that large volumes of information about individuals’ behavior and 
personal details is collected, which means that material consisting of personal 
information must be managed and stored within the organisation in line with 
applicable law (Eneman, et al 2018).  
 
Privacy  
Concern regarding surveillance in modern societies have mainly focused upon the 
issue of privacy. Like surveillance, privacy is a concept difficult to capture, and 
researchers of privacy have struggled with defining this ambiguous term. Originally, 
privacy was defined as the right to be let alone, but in our contemporary digital 
society, the term privacy is often understood and defined as the right to control 
information about oneself (Helm and Seubert, 2020). Solove (2005) argues that most 
discussions of privacy appeal to people’s fears and anxieties, but commentators often 
fail to translate those instincts into a reasoned, well-articulated account of why 
privacy problems are harmful. Therefore, it is unclear precisely what people mean 
when they claim that privacy should be protected. To remedy this situation, Solove 
has suggested a taxonomy of privacy that acknowledges that privacy is not a unitary 
concept with a uniform value, which is unvarying across different situations. Instead, 
privacy in Solove’s taxonomy can be understood as protection from a cluster of 
related activities that impinge upon people in related ways, and the taxonomy 
organises these problematic activities into four overarching groups or categories:  
 
(1) Information collection. Information is collected via surveillance or interrogation 
and creates disruption through the process of gathering information about the subject, 
often ubiquitously without informed content. Surveillance is the watching of, listening 
to, or recording of an individual’s activities, whereas interrogation consists of various 
forms of questioning or probing for information. Even if no information is revealed 
publicly, information collection per se can constitute a breach of privacy.  
(2) Information processing. Information processing refers to the storage, 
manipulation, and use of information that has previously been collected. This includes 
the aggregation of various pieces of information about a person, and the use of 
information collected for one purpose for a different purpose without the data 
subject’s consent. It also covers the failure to allow the data subject to know about the 
information that others have about her and participate in its handling and use. 
(3) Information dissemination. Information dissemination is one of the broadest 
groupings of privacy harms and involves the spreading or transfer of personal data or 
the threat to do so. This includes activities such as breach of confidentiality or 
exposure of sensitive material, the revelation of truthful information about a person 
that impacts the way others judge her character as well as dissemination of false or 
misleading information.  
(4) Invasion. The fourth and final group of activities involves invasions into people’s 
personal businesses. Invasion harms differ from the harms of information collection, 
processing, and dissemination because they do not always explicitly involve 
information. Intrusion may involve invasive acts that disturb one’s tranquility of 
solitude, but also decisional interference that involves the government’s incursion into 
the data subject’s private affairs.  
 
The progression from information collection to processing to dissemination is the 
information moving further and further away from the data subject, making control of 
these activities increasingly difficult. Invasion, in contrast, progresses toward the data 
subject and involves impingements directly on the individual. The relationship 
between these different categories is illustrated in Figure 1. 
 
 
Figure 1. The A taxonomy of privacy (Source: Solove, 2005) 
 
 
 
 
3 Research Design  
In our quest to learn how public authorities handle the tension between security and 
privacy, we will study the Swedish police authority as our main empirical setting and 
also at later stages include related authorities, e.g., the Ministry of Justice, the Data 
Protection Authority, the Swedish Prosecution Authority, the Crime Prevention 
Council and the Swedish Civil Contingencies. The police is a public authority with a 
broad societal mission aimed at reducing crime and increasing security in society 
through preventive, interventive, and investigative activities (Manning, 2016). This 
implies that the police constitutes a concrete case of government work that must relate 
to a variety of requirements for accountable, legitimate and lawful work (Eneman et 
al, 2018).  
 
The study is designed as a qualitative study (Silverman, 2018) and we will combine 
interviews and document studies for collecting empirical material with the ambition to 
capture different perspectives involved in shaping the digital surveillance practices. 
We will interview repondents with different interest and involvement in surveillance 
practices and analyse relevant official documents (e.g. legislation, statutes, policies 
and more). By combining these two methods, the study will be able to compare 
different perspectives on surveillance and form a broad understanding of how public 
authorities in a western digital society handle the tension between the opportunities 
with digital surveillance and protecting citizens integrity and privacy. Our primary 
source of material will be obtained through structured in-depth interviews (Holloway 
and Jefferson, 2004). We choose to conduct interviews as it is a useful technique for 
gaining insights into the perceptions, experiences, values, feelings and understanding 
of individuals, and an understanding how they construct, make sense of and give 
meaning to their worldviews (Czarniawska, 2008).  
 
In order to understand the digital surveillance practices from several different angels 
and further capture the broader organisational context, we will also collect and 
analyse documents that are relevant to the project (Alvesson and Sveningsson, 2008). 
This can include everything from legislation, policy documents, political debates, 
proposals, directives to more operational meeting documentation. Through the 
document studies, the project is given the opportunity to investigate the formalities 
surrounding the practices where surveillance technologies are involved, and how these 
practices have been developed and are being developed in a wider institutional and 
political context. Documents as empirical material can often be a valuable source to 
better understand the broader organisational context, as organisational systems should 
be understood on the basis that they do not occur naturally in society but always have 
a historical and political origin and benefit certain interests at the expense of others 
(Prior, 2003). 
 
We will conduct analysis and theorising as an integral part throughout the research 
process (Alvesson and Sveningsson, 2008). When we approach the material, our 
attention will on patterns, variations and not least the unexpected (Coffey & Atkinson, 
1996). In order to ensure that the project is conducted in line with appropriate research 
ethics we will follow the instructions from the Swedish Ethical Review Authority and 
the ethical research principles formulated by the Swedish Research Council regarding 
social science research. 
 
 
4 Concluding Reflections 
This study set out to deepen the knowledge about digital surveillance practices within 
the police authority in the light of the new extended mandate, caused by the recent 
law change. We recognize that the police has high expectations related to the 
introduction of digital surveillance as part of police work, more specifically the 
expectations refer to increased efficiency and security, as well as strengthen 
accountability and trust in the police. However, the literature also expresses concerns 
about threats to citizens’ integrity and privacy claiming that hat current privacy 
measures are insufficient in relation to new powerful technologies (Helm and Seubert, 
2020; Solove, 2011). These different expectations imply that the consequences that 
digital surveillance gives rise to, can be understood both on individual, organisational 
and societal level, and brings with it both opportunities and dilemmas. In accordance, 
this study draws on empirical material that reflects how police officers tackle these 
different challenges related to digital surveillance practices. In particular, we study the 
balance and tensions between the police authority’s interest and need to increase 
security and citizen’s right to integrity and privacy which constitute important 
democratic values.  
 
We need to understand how these new means for digital surveillance are embedded in 
different social settings and practices shaped by different social norms in addition to 
laws. We need more knowledge about how the police and other regulatory authorities 
approach the use of digital surveillance in relation to expectations on legitimacy and 
the rule of law. This further highlights the need of regulation and policies focusing 
both on the use of digital surveillance technologies and the storage and management 
of the collected data, that often includes both personal data and also personal sensitive 
data (Matzner, 2016). 
  
Research shows, however, that surveillance technologies develop fast and that the 
regulative frameworks that try to shape these emerging modes of governmentality are 
still in their infancy (Murray, 2016). There is thus little guidance for managers and 
policy makers trying to decide what data is allowed to be collected, under what 
circumstances, how it can be analysed, how and for how long it can be stored, and 
who should have access to the data (Eneman et al, 2019). However, surveillance 
should not only be understood in terms of laws and regulations, but also from a moral 
and ethical perspective. Not everything that is legal is morally desirable in society and 
we therefore need to understand all the implications the digital development has on 
our society. Surveillance conducted at state levels through public authorities is clearly 
a topical area in need for more research.  
 
We contribute to the theoretical development of digital surveillance by linking to the 
research fields of surveillance and privacy. The topology suggested by Solove (2005) 
offers analytical tools to deconstruct privacy in a useful way, and thus allowed us to 
investigate more easily different aspects of privacy. Our work will continue to provide 
feedback on the value of the topology and hopefully be able to update, modify, and 
fine tune it. In future research it would also be interesting to include how citizens 
respond to the intensified surveillance in society, conducted by regulatory authorities 
such as the Police. Not least since some researchers argue that surveillance evoke 
active resistance (Ball, 2006; Eneman, et al 2018). We hope that this paper will 
provide a catalyst for a continued debate and knowledge development of how public 
regulative authorities manage the balance of security and privacy when it comes to 
digital surveillance conducted by public authorities in society. 
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